

DRAFT:GACarver, Jr.
3 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George A. Carver, Jr.
SUBJECT: Intelligence Support to National Decision Making
in Periods of Crisis

I. THE PROBLEM

For intelligence, as for many other spheres of activity, the past three decades have constituted a period of dramatic, even revolutionary change. Burgeoning technology has given us collection capabilities (and budgets) that would have been literally unthinkable at the close of World War II. Our organizational and procedural concepts, however, have changed much more slowly. They have not accounted for or been adapted to the changes technology has made in the intelligence environment. As a result, we are in a situation where technology can actually inhibit rather than facilitate doing those things the US intelligence community was created to do.

The US intelligence community has three basic sets of responsibilities:

-- Strategic warning; i.e., providing advance warning of an impending attack upon the United States -- or on US forces abroad -- by a foreign power, or warning of the fact that a foreign power is planning -- or even seriously contemplating -- such an attack.

SECRET

2

25X1

-- Providing support, of all kinds, to those who, under our Constitution, make the decisions which determine ^{our} country's foreign and national security policy. This function obviously is of particular importance in stress periods of potential, imminent or actual crises.

-- Providing support to the conduct of foreign policy and the execution of national security decisions, including support to the conduct of wartime operations.

Our present national intelligence structure is not optimally designed to perform these functions. In particular, it is not set up to cope with the stresses and demands of a period of major crisis and is even less well structured to handle the requirements of a wartime situation -- a fact made unescapably obvious by recent exercises such as [REDACTED]

The reasons for these design flaws are not hard to discern. At one level they derive from the fact that the US intelligence community, and its several components, serve a variety of customers -- from the President and the NSC to a battallion commander -- many whom have different interests, perspectives, needs and requirements. These interests can frequently be competitive, especially in matters relating to the allocation of collection or analytic resources, or the tasking of systems which cannot handle the requirements of all users simultaneously.

At another level, however, the problems alluded to above derive from the fact that we do not really have a national intelligence system. Instead, ~~we have two, with many components of the community being members of both.~~

SECRET

25X1

At another level, however, the problems alluded to above derive from the fact that we do not really have a single, integrated national intelligence system. Instead, we have two systems, with most components of the community being members of both.

a. One could be termed the 1947 Act System.

This is the intelligence community whose foundations were laid in Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 and which has evolved over almost three decades into the conglomerate described and defined in Executive Order 11905. At its apex is a Director of Central Intelligence, the President's principal foreign intelligence officer and advisor who reports directly to the NSC and is not subordinate to the head of any cabinet department. The DCI chairs two important bodies: one -- the Committee on Foreign Intelligence -- plays a key role in developing and allocating the community's resources; the other -- the National Foreign Intelligence Board -- plays a key role in guiding the community's substantive work and in the production of national intelligence. A major element of this 1947 Act system is the Central Intelligence Agency, which the DCI also heads, an independent entity, not a component of any cabinet department, which reports through the DCI to the NSC, which -- within the 1947 Act system -- has primary responsibility for covert collection and covert action, and which has a major role in the production of national (as opposed to departmental) intelligence.

*why?
justification
EO 11905*

~~SECRET~~

25X1

b. The other could be termed the NCA System. This is the system being developed by the Department of Defense to interface with its Worldwide Military Command and Control System. The Defense Department planners developing this NCA system naturally incorporate within it all the intelligence assets and components of the Defense Department, though these comprise roughly 80% of the assets of the 1947 Act System's intelligence community.

The two systems described above do not really track or mesh:

-- They are built on different concepts:

-- The 1947 Act System is built on the concept of an intelligence community, with military and civilian components, headed by a non-departmental DCI and fashioned to support the President, especially in his role as head of the National Security Council, the NSC Staff, and all of the NSC departments.

-- The NCA System is built on the concept of the "National Command Authority", a line running from the President -- in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief -- through the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS and the JCS (as an institution) to major US military commanders in the field, the CINCS. As recent exercises have demonstrated, few of the concepts or institutions around which the 1947 Act System was built -- the NSC, the WSAG, the Secretary of State, the non-departmental

~~SECRET~~

25X1

DCI, and the CIA -- fit easily into the NCA schema.

-- They are keyed to different environments:

-- The 1947 Act System was *shaped by experience* designed, primarily to function in a peacetime environment, to support the President and the NSC and its members (plus to some extent, the Congress) in formulating and conducting foreign and national security policy. Oversimplifying, *as it was done* it was designed to help our government prevent or avoid major crises, including war -- not as a mechanism for assisting in the conduct of wartime operations. (All of the pertinent statutes and Executive Orders, for example, are silent on what the DCI's wartime role is supposed to be.)

-- They are focused on different perceptions of intelligence needs:

-- The 1947 Act System, oversimplifying again, is designed to support the making of political decisions (which may, of course, have significant military ingredients). It is built to produce information, analyses, assessments and estimates on the political dynamics of foreign situations, the policies and intentions of foreign governments, and the factors which are likely to shape, influence or alter these foreign governments' policies.

-- The NCA System is designed to help the President (as Commander-in-Chief), the Secretary of Defense, the JCS and the CINCS fight a war. It is keyed to monitoring the concrete -- *troop deployment and other forms of* actual behavior -- not to assessing such abstractions as

~~SECRET~~

25X1

6

political dynamics, priorities, goals or intentions.

To make matters worse, not only are these two overlapping systems significantly different in concept, design and purpose, no real planning has been done on whether, when or how the US intelligence structure should shift from one to the other. *but are basically responsible* Such transition questions are thorny and not easily resolved. They involve major issues of jurisdiction and asset control. They also have built in tensions. The natural instinct of those who would be responsible for fighting a war is to want to take control of the intelligence assets they would need in wartime as early as possible in any crisis situation which could potentially end in hostilities. The natural instincts of senior officials with other responsibilities, however, run in precisely the opposite direction; for they would want to maximize the President and the NSC's flexibility by postponing as long as possible any diminution of the US intelligence community's capability for contributing to the peacetime political decision-making process.

The net result of the above factors is that the US intelligence community is not well postured to support the President and his senior advisors in a serious crisis situation, *and even less well postured to do so in wartime.* The lack of clarity about what peacetime-crisis-wartime transition arrangements should be, how they should work, and when -- and on whose orders -- they should be implemented, almost guarantees confusion and diminished national intelligence capabilities at the very time when these can least be afforded.

II. Steps Toward A Solution

The solution to the problems described above lies in a proper perception of the way political events, including foreign threats to the

~~SECRET~~

25X1

7

security of the United States, actually develop and interact. Peacetime, crises, and wartime are not discreet states; the latter two can develop quickly but they do not come out of nowhere. In foreign affairs, instead, what you have is a continuum, ranging from peacetime or "normalcy" to all out thermonuclear war. This continuum bounds a dynamic process, full of continuously interacting variables. For conceptual purposes, we divide it into four segments; but this four-segment cut is arbitrary -- it could be one, two or an infinite number -- and it is essential to understand that each of these segments is a portion of a continuum, with each growing out of that which precedes it and shading into that which follows. In our opinion, however, the problems outlined above can best be addressed if we think in terms of intelligence support arrangements needed to support national decision making, and the execution of national policy, in four different environments:

a. The first is "normalcy", the kind of situation that existed on 1 August 1976. The world is full of tension, stress, and actual or potential strife; there are many messy situations (e.g., Lebanon), but there is no immediate likelihood of hostilities in which the US would be directly involved or of any attack on the US or US forces.

b. The second is what we call a "small-c crisis". This is a situation which engages the urgent attention of the President and his senior foreign policy advisors (civilian and military), which requires special concentration, decisions, and/or procedures -- e.g., special WSAG or NSC meetings -- but does not involve the threat of major hostilities in which US forces would be attacked

SECRET

25X1

or a physical attack on the territory of the United States.

Lebanon, at various times, has become a "small-c" crisis.

Another example ^{الاردن} ~~was~~ be the Mayaguez incident.

c. The third, closely related to the second, is what we call a "capital-C crisis". Its hallmark would be a situation which could readily involve a significant use of US forces or a direct confrontation -- even if this were initially a political confrontation -- with a foreign power capable of physically attacking the home territory of the United States, e.g., the Soviet Union. A new Middle East war in which the Soviets were directly backing at least some Arab protagonists (e.g., the Syrians) while we were supporting the Israelis would be an example of a capital-C crisis. Similarly, a capital-C crisis could be swiftly generated in Yugoslavia were Tito to die and the Soviets to fish in succession waters in a way we considered unacceptable.

d. The fourth is wartime, which we define as a situation in which US forces are engaged in combat with forces of a foreign power capable of physically attacking the United States. Vietnam would not have been a wartime situation under this definition; an outbreak of hostilities in Central Europe would be, whether or not war had been formally declared and whether or not nuclear weapons had been used.

None of the four stages of the continuum concept outlined above is static. A situation can evolve from one to the other slowly or quickly, and can move in either direction -- depending on what the various actors concerned (including the US) do or do not do. Each,

SECRET

25X1

~~SECRET~~

9

however, poses its own special requirements for intelligence support to national decision making, and the continuum concept provides useful context for developing smooth, efficient transitional arrangements.

If these arrangements are to be smooth and efficient, however, they ~~too~~ must be ^{total} transitional. Each new set of arrangements should build on those of the preceeding continuum segment, with no radical revisions of the way the US intelligence community does its business, no sudden injection of totally different concepts or procedures, there will inevitably be unavoidable confusion and just when ^{avoidable} confusion would do the most damage. Also, if intelligence is to provide optimum support to national decision making at the times when the best possible assessments of a putative adversary's behavior are most needed, adequate measures ^{will} have to be taken to ensure that those framing these assessments ^{are} ~~be~~ fully apprised of what the US is doing -- i.e., of US actions (from force deployments to hot line messages) which could be influencing the behavior of foreign governments or to which the latter could be reacting.

Outlined below is an analysis of each of these four stages and the kind of intelligence structure each requires to support national decision making and the execution of national policy ~~in them.~~

III. Normalcy

The composition of the intelligence community and its normal mode of operation need no rehearsal here. Within it, however, are two instrumentalities which can or should serve as building blocks for transitional arrangements:

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

10

25X1

in two
-- One is the non-departmental current production of
CIA: the WHSRs, the National Intelligence Daily Cable,
and the President's Daily Brief.

-- The other is the National Intelligence Officer System
which gives the DCI a group of senior assistants, each
experienced in working with all elements of the community on
major substantive problem areas.

Requirement Systems: D.C. managed
Commo

SECRET

25X1

Dick Muckner

IV. SMALL "C" CRISIS

A. Definition

Small "c" crises are foreign situations of sufficient import to the United States to require the urgent planning and decision-making attention of the President and his senior advisors, but not of sufficient scope or seriousness to contain the imminent risk of U.S. military conflict with a major nuclear power. Small "c" crises may or may not directly involve U.S. military forces and they ^amay or may not involve major power support to minor countries. But in all cases, they involve situations affecting significant U.S. interests and require timely assessment and Presidential-level decisions. Such crises may be short-term and local in scope or they may escalate (slowly or rapidly) into a threat^{of} conflict between U.S. military forces and forces of a major power with nuclear capabilities (a Large "C" crisis).

B. Crisis Management

The intelligence support required in a small "c" crisis is determined by the types of decision-making and planning machinery brought into play to cope with the crisis and the scope and nature of the crisis itself. In general, each crisis - however small in scope and significance or short in duration - energizes contingency planning groups in the Defense and State Departments and in the National Security Council. These may include an Interagency Crisis Task Force chaired by a senior State

Department official, any of a variety of groups within the JCS structure (a Crisis Action Group, an NMCC Task Force, the Operations Deputies Committees, etc. - all established in formal JCS plans} for differing levels of crisis), the Washington Special Action Group (an NSC subcommittee for crisis management) or an ad hoc group (such as the EXCOM of the Cuban Missile Crisis). A sufficiently serious crisis will convene the NSC at frequent intervals - chaired by the President. All of these mechanisms have certain common features:

1. These groups meet to consider the crisis situation and its significance and to prepare options for U.S. foreign policy on military actions for Presidential decision.
2. Since World War II, virtually all crises decisions - large or small - are Presidential/Commander-in-Chief decisions and the State/Defense/NSC groups mentioned above (or their predecessor by other names) have been the principal places where policy on action options are developed for Presidential decision. This is not to minimize the role or the value of recommendations from Ambassadors or Unified Commanders in the field, but to emphasise the highly centralized character of crisis planning and decision-making.
3. These groups have tended to use such intelligence information as the members of the group personally bring with them, to rely on available situation reporting on periodic situation briefings.

There has been a tendency to accept passively such intelligence as is available and, except for an occasional request for an estimate, not to aggressively seek intelligence appreciations on the various decision^N options as they are developed. This is coupled with the natural tendency of promoters of particular courses of action not to seek views that could counter their proposals and the tendency toward secretiveness, particularly when delicate and sensitive international negotiations are involved - a secretiveness that has often excluded intelligence views from planning and decision-making.

4. Generally, these groups have not asked whether the actions they are proposing can be supported adequately by intelligence or whether new capabilities need to be created either by redeployment or retasking of existing assets.

C. Crisis Intelligence Requirements

1. The prime intelligence requirement in crises is for current, detailed intelligence information on activities in the crisis area to answer the question, "what's happening?". Basically, the same level of detail and need for timely information is required at both the Presidential and field commander level. It is this prime requirement for current intelligence that primarily drives intelligence actions and focus during crises.

2. The second intelligence requirement in these types of crises is for quick reporting and analysis on world reaction to the crisis to answer the ~~general~~ question, "what does everyone else think about this

situation and what are they doing about it?" Depending on the scope and significance of the crises, this requirement calls for increasing attention to intelligence ^{ICA}inductions of foreign responses to the crisis and special attention to the more significant of these. It is in this requirement that the specific topical needs for information may vary significantly between field commander's local interests and the President's global view.

3. The third type of crisis intelligence requirement is the need for information and estimates to support specific foreign policy and military plans. Estimates of probable foreign reaction accompany (or should accompany) each option put forward for decision. Detailed basic military and geographical intelligence are needed for the development of each proposal for military action and intelligence judgments on foreign political, social, and economic factors are required for the planning of foreign policy initiations and covert action proposals. Much of the effort to meet these requirements should come from increased analytic efforts rather than new intelligence collection initiatives.


D. Intelligence Management in Crises

1. To provide the intelligence support required to the crises managers, as described above, the Intelligence Community currently takes some or all the following actions, depending on the scope and seriousness of the situation:

a. At the DCI level:

1. The DCI participates in WSAG and NSC deliberations.
2. Alert Memoranda are issued by an NIO.
3. Strategic Warning Notices are initiated by the Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning.
4. An Interagency Task Force is formed by the DCI to produce a National Intelligence Situation Report on a 24-hour basis.
5. Special conferencing communications are established by the ICS for use by Community analytic elements.

25X



2. The above actions are considered and undertaken separately by each intelligence agency without direction^{from}, coordination^{with}, or - in ~~my~~^{many} case^s - knowledge of the DCI.

a. Each manager reorders the collection ^{of} analytical resources under his command independently, basing his actions on target opportunities, systems capabilities, organizational flexibilities, and

on their separate judgment and experience (usually both excellent) on the needs of crisis managers. There has been ^{COMPREHENSIVE} no stock-taking at key points in a crisis situation to see if the intelligence provided is adequate and relevant to the significant decisions to be made. Consequently, there is no review by intelligence managers during a crisis of the effectiveness of intelligence actions responding to the crisis to identify shortfalls or overkills and to consider additional measures. This is not surprising as there is presently no mechanism in the Intelligence Community to review, evaluate, or guide the activities of intelligence collectors processors and producers during a crisis to insure that intelligence is sensitive to changes in target opportunities, U.S. operational activities and significant decision options.

b. There is no regular, formal reporting by intelligence managers to the DCI on the status of our intelligence capabilities and actions during a crisis. This contrasts with the relatively close communications and coordination within the analytic community during a crisis.

c. Except for the presence of the DCI in NSA and WSAG deliberations and the ad hoc relationship between various NIO's ^{or} individual intelligence component managers with senior State and Defense officials, there is no mechanism for insuring that the DCI is kept informed in a current and comprehensive manner of the intelligence needs of crisis managers and operational planners - including the intelligence needs of field commanders.

d. No Community-level component is presently charged with comprehensively examining the Community's ability to cope with small "c" crises and to prepare procedures and mechanisms for improving the DCI's ability to both manage the Community during a crisis and to improve the Community's performance during future crises.

e. No Community-level facility is presently available to collect, evaluate, and report to the DCI on intelligence capabilities, actions, and needs or to coordinate Community activities and support to crisis managers, planners, and operating forces during a crisis.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 4 August 76
TO: Crisis Management Group		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p>Attached is a rough draft of the beginning of the paper.</p>		
FROM: George A. Carver, Jr.		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)